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The rise and fall of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) parallels the promised
but eventually unfulfilled modernization agenda of  Harold Wilson’s government. The
diary kept by Samuel Brittan for the fourteen months in which he served as an
‘irregular’ in the DEA provides a unique source for understanding the growth
ambitions of the new government. Paul Brighton finds the diaries as a whole, with
their excellent introduction and commentary, are inevitably an unintended elegy to an
era of lost economic optimism — an optimism that was always built on sand.
Inside the Department of  Economic Affairs: Samuel Brit tan,
the Diary of  an ‘Irregular’, 1964-6. Roger Middleton (ed). Oxford
University Press. April 2012.
   
Rows between the PM and GB? Surely not yet  another volume of
Alastair Campbell’s diaries of  the Blair years! Turf  wars between
the Treasury and other departments? Uncertainty as to who is
ult imately in charge of  government economic policy? Yes, we know:
Blair and Brown are throwing the crockery again!
But, hang on. It  turns out history didn’t  start  in 1997 af ter all. This is
1964. The Prime Minister is Harold Wilson, the Chancellor is Jim
Callaghan, and the year is 1964. Ok, so who’s “GB”? Why, the
Secretary of  State for Economic Affairs, of  course: the Deputy Labour Leader George Brown.
But, if  Callaghan is Chancellor, and Brown’s heading Economic Affairs, and arguably the most
economically literate Prime Minister of  the Twent ieth Century is in 10, Downing Street, who’s
actually running the economy? Perhaps we need an outsider to tell us: especially if  it ’s an outsider
recruited to the inside.
Enter Samuel Brit tan. Elder brother of  the as yet unknown Leon, but already an inf luent ial Financial
Times journalist , Brit tan has been brought into the newly-founded DEA as a “Whitehall irregular”.
He thinks he’s there to give George Brown the benef it  of  his economic insights. Brown, however,
may just  have pulled a fast  one, and co-opted the well-known journalist ic analyst  of  the Tories’
thirteen years of  Treasury misrule as a speechwriter and proto-spin doctor.
If  we’re hoping for immediate insights into the inner sanctum of economic policy making, day one is
a lit t le bit  of  a disappointment. “Gloomy toilet  with no soap or towel. I donated a piece of  soap to
the toilet , which af terwards vanished.” But surely some insider analysis can’t  be long in coming.
“Apparent ly suggest ion of  a modern type t icking roller towel has never got anywhere in Whitehall!”
However, the Whitehall turf  bat t les soon take a turn for the better. By Day Four: “Have got own
‘secretary’ – an elderly audio-typist  who is t rying to cope!” Soon, he ascends to the dizzy heights
of having three telephones on his desk. “Then one was put on the f loor and started ringing! A
grey-beige one was put in and then disconnected and then put in again.” This, perhaps, if  it  were a
French symbolist  narrat ive, might stand as a mot if  of  Brit ish economic policy in the 1960s.
Harold Wilson believed in “creat ive tension” between the new DEA and the Treasury; and, as has
often been remarked, if  the creat ivity was occasionally hard to spot, the tension was never in
short  supply. Wilson was arguably a much more literal t riangulator than ever Blair or Clinton
managed to be. The only dif ference was that his t riangulat ion was all about personnel. Elected as
the lef t -of-centre candidate for the Labour leadership on the sudden death of  Hugh Gaitskell in
early 1963, by an essent ially Right ist  parliamentary Labour Party, what could be better than to
deploy his two more-or-less Gaitskellite leadership campaign opponents in posit ions where they
would essent ially be f ight ing each other for control of  the management of  the economy, rather
than f ight ing him for the leadership and the premiership?
Popular wisdom suggested that it  was all concocted between Wilson and the runner-up Brown in
the back of  a taxi. In fact , the idea of  a separate DEA had been much longer in the planning. At its
heart  was the idea of  the tact ical, day-to-day Treasury managing the currency and the short-term
f luctuat ions of  the markets, and agreeing the appropriate f iscal and monetary responses; while
the DEA took the strategic view, coming up with a brand-new Nat ional Plan to help Britain plan its
economic priorit ies for the years ahead.
The key quest ion, however, rarely explicit ly answered at  the t ime, was whether the Nat ional Plan
was some grand, democrat ised Soviet-style economic blueprint ; or merely a rebranded version of
the mildly intervent ionist  Nat ional Economic Development Corporat ion (known colloquially as
NEDY, along with its more specialised of fshoots, the “lit t le NEDDIES”) of  the later Tory years.
Macmillan, Douglas-Home, and their Chancellor, Reggie Maudling (for whose economic policies
Brit tan f requent ly ut ters secret  paeans of  praise in the privacy of  the diary) had already taken
several steps along this dirigiste path in the early 1960s.
This, incidentally, gives us the best of  the relat ively few wit t icisms in the book. George Brown, as is
well documented, was of ten (in the journalist ic phrase) “t ired and emot ional” af ter downing more
than a few drinks at  evening funct ions. His absences from meet ings the following morning were
euphemist ically described as “morning sickness”. Af ter one too many of  these absences, a
sardonic Wilson enquired as to whether Brown’s morning sickness meant that  he was about to
give birth to a lit t le NEDY!
The diaries as a whole, with their excellent  introduct ion and commentary, are inevitably an
unintended elegy to an era of  lost  economic opt imism. But the opt imism was always built  on sand.
A Nat ional Plan erected on the foundat ions of  a refusal even to contemplate the opt ion which
might have smoothed its birth – the devaluat ion of  the pound – was always doomed. Samuel
Brit tan’s own involvement lasted for just  fourteen months. After that , he returned to journalism,
and to the task of  updat ing his book on recent Treasury history. The pound endured at  its post-
war level for a further twenty-two months. The DEA experiment ef fect ively ended with the onset
of  economic crisis and Brown’s departure in 1966 (although it  cont inued in shadowy form in other
hands for a while longer). Callaghan was shif ted af ter the inevitable forced devaluat ion in 1967.
Meanwhile, Harold Wilson, like John Major af ter Black Wednesday in 1992, survived in of f ice, while
being obliged to extol the virtues of  an economic policy he had spent his f irst  years in of f ice lif t ing
heaven and earth to avoid. By the General Elect ion of  1970, the defence of  the pound, like the
DEA itself , was barely a distant memory.
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